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INTRODUCTION
Knowing market participants’ expectations of the key policy
rate is of key importance for central banks for a number of
reasons. One is that monetary policy works properly if it can
influence market participants’ expectations efficiently, and if
the interest rate path that market participants expect to
materialise is in line with the steps planned to be taken by
central banks. Therefore, it is important that monetary
policymakers monitor how their decisions and
communications affect these expectations. Moreover, market
participants’ interest rate expectations may themselves
contain useful information about market participants’
perceptions of economic developments, which decision-
makers may want to incorporate into their own assessment of
the outlook.
As market participants’ expectations cannot be observed
directly, quantification of these expectations is not any easy
task. The most common approaches used to identify future
policy rate expectations fall into two main categories. One is
surveys conducted among market participants (traders and
analysts). Respondents are regularly asked about their future
policy rate expectations for various specific points in time
(e.g. the end of the following month, the given year and the
one following it). Their answers contain direct information
on the expected path of the key policy rate. If respondents
attempt to offer the most accurate forecast of central bank
rates, their answers will indeed reflect their actual interest
rate expectations. But there is no absolute guarantee for this,
as there is no stake involved in the opinion that respondents
express, i.e. they do not incur any losses if they fail to forecast
the actual interest rate accurately, and they gain nothing if
they do not. Consequently, answers may reflect a number of
other underlying motivations: it may, for instance, be the
case that a rate of interest assumed to be the most likely
rather than the one actually expected is provided as a
forecast, or some analysts may want to provide accurate
projections when most err significantly, and thus they
provide a less likely value as the expected rate. If such is the
case, surveys can provide a skewed measure of market
participants’ actual expectations. Another possible approach
is that we infer market participants’ expectations from the
prices of the financial instruments which are closely related
to interest rate expectations. There are a number of
instruments whose returns depend strongly on the current
and future base rate; it should be noted, however, that their
liquidity and credit risk may vary. Accordingly, returns on
these instruments embody, in addition to the interest rate
expectations, the premium demanded as compensation for
these risks, which are difficult to identify and measure when
expectations are interpreted. Relying on two different data
Learning market participants’ policy rate expectations is a major issue for central banks. The underlying reason for this is that
the interest rate expectations of market participants may themselves contain information on market participants’ perceptions
of the economic prospects, which decision-makers might want to incorporate into their own assessment of the outlook. Market
participants’ expectations, however, cannot be observed directly and are difficult to quantify. Of the two most common
approaches, we will discuss in detail the one where we infer market expectations from the prices of the financial instruments
which are closely related to expectations. In properly functioning, liquid markets we can infer market participants’ expectations
of future interest rates from the prices of and returns on government securities and inter-bank transactions. Before the onset of
the financial crisis, BUBOR (Budapest Inter-bank Offered Rate) reflected market participants’ expectations of the interest rate
relatively reliably, but since the deepening of the crisis, this has changed for a number of reasons, which we will also seek to
pinpoint. The fact that BUBOR no longer reflects real market expectations, i.e. it distorts them, is all the more important as
this measure serves as a benchmark rate for other financial products, among other things, for corporate loans. The loss of the
information content of BUBOR means that the yield curve derived from returns on inter-bank market instruments provides a
more accurate measure of market expectations if we exclude data on BUBOR fixings. Nevertheless, forward rate agreements
(FRAs) settled on BUBOR remain suitable for the quantification of market participants’ expectations. However, in interpreting
these, it is important that, in addition to credit and liquidity risk premia, the bias caused by BUBOR should also be taken into
consideration.
Klára Pintér and György Pulai: Measuring
interest rate expectations from market yields:
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concluded that the yield curve computed from government
securities yields and Reuters surveys were both good
approximations of market participants’ expectations.
Nevertheless, neither provides a direct, unbiased measure,
and expectations derived from the two data sources may
often vary significantly.
1 Thus, consistent with central bank
practice, it seems reasonable to use several possible
approaches and interpret them together when monitoring
developments in expectations. Supplementing our earlier
study, this time we offer a more in-depth analysis of recent
changes in interest rate expectations computed from market
instruments. We will present the instruments whose returns
may serve as a starting point for measuring expectations, the
bias they may contain and the ways in which the recent
turbulences in the financial markets have affected their
information content.
MEASURING INTEREST RATE
EXPECTATIONS WITH THE PRICES OF
MARKET INSTRUMENTS
Forward yields computed from returns on a financial
instrument with various maturities are equal to the sum of the
expected future interest rate and the risk premium usually
charged for the given instrument or group of instruments.
The most important risk factors facing investors in the
market of these instruments that reflect policy rate
expectations are credit – counterparty – and liquidity risks.
Credit or counterparty risk is the risk run by investors that
the counterparties to which they extend credit will default.
Liquidity risk means the risk that markets may vary according
to how easy and affordable trading is in them, which costs the
trading involves. If, for any reason, market participants
consider an instrument to be riskier than lending to the
central bank, they demand a premium in return for taking on
risks, which, in turn, means returns higher than the base rate.
As we can compute the sum of only these two components
(i.e. the expected interest rate and the premium expected in
return for the perceived risk) from market returns, in order
to be able to identify expectations of the future path of
interest rates, we must make some assumption on risk
premia. The conventional assumption used when
determining the expected path of the interest rate is that risk
premia are constant over time. If this condition is fulfilled,
both premia and the expected path of the interest rate can be
estimated over a longer horizon, or we may make inferences
about changes in expectations directly from changes in
returns.
WHAT YIELDS HELP US MAKE
INFERENCES ABOUT INTEREST RATE
EXPECTATIONS?
Government securities are the most obvious choice for
measuring expectations. Relative to the credit risk posed by
the central bank policy instrument, they are close to being
risk free in terms of credit risks, and the deviation of forward
yields from the expected path of interest rates is due mainly
to liquidity premia. Therefore, forward yields computed
from yield curves comprising the information content of
government securities with various maturities offer a good
approximation of the future path of central bank rates as long
as the government securities market is sufficiently liquid.
Alternatively, we may infer market participants’ expectations
of interest rates from the prices of certain inter-bank
transactions (unsecured lending and deposit transactions,
forward rate agreements and interest rate swap deals) or from
estimated yield curves comprising the information content of
various instruments.
2 In order to be able to measure short-
term expectations (i.e. those over a time horizon for up to 1
year), we use BUBOR or forward rate agreements (FRAs).
BUBOR (Budapest Inter-bank Offered Rate) denotes the rate
at which commercial banks are willing, for various
maturities, to provide unsecured loans to each other. The
MNB collects – from the domestic commercial banks –
quotes for a maturity range of 1 day to 1 year, which serve
as a basis for setting BUBOR, daily, at a pre-set point of
time. Pursuant to the regulations of the Hungarian FOREX
Association, quoting banks participating in the setting of
BUBOR undertake to quote real inter-bank lending interest
rates valid at the time of fixing. BUBOR depends
fundamentally on the interest rate expectations of banks;
however, as it is a rate charged for unsecured lending, it also
contains a credit risk premium demanded in return for
counterparty default. Furthermore, as the liquidity situation
of the banking system also affects the terms and conditions
under which banks lend each other, interest rates also
contain a liquidity premium.
3 Accordingly, BUBOR reflects
the interest rate expectations of banks along with a credit
risk and liquidity premium.
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1 Gábriel and Pintér (2006).
2 For a detailed presentation of how inter-bank transactions are used for estimating the yield curve, see Reppa (2008).
3 Changes in very short-term interest rates are due to short-term fluctuations in liquidity; in order to measure interest rate expectations we only take into consideration
BUBOR with a two-week or longer maturity.Forward rate agreements (FRAs) are arrangements in which
two parties agree on a notional interest rate to be paid, at a
specified settlement date, on a notional amount of principal
that is never exchanged; the only payment (the payment of
the settlement amount) that takes place relates to the
difference between the agreed FRA rate and the prevailing
market rate (or benchmark rate) at the time of settlement.
Transactions are settled when their maturity period actually
begins, i.e. after the conclusion of an FRA with a 3-month
maturity starting 3 months later, the parties to the agreement
will exchange fixed interest rate payments for floating
interest rate payments in three months. In HUF FRAs the
benchmark rate is BUBOR, thus, the two rates correlate
strongly. Similar to inter-bank lending transactions, FRAs
also contain a liquidity premium and one compensating the
credit risk run by the counterparty. But as only the interest
due is exchanged, and the principal is not, the credit risk
premium may be lower than in standard lending transactions.
FRAs with a maturity of 3 months 1 to 12 months ahead are
traded in the inter-bank market. In order for longer-term
interest rate expectations to be quantified, interest rate swap
(IRS) transactions
4 can be used. Parties to IRS transactions
exchange interest rate payments on amounts denominated in
the same currency. In the most common and most widely
used form of IRS transactions one party receives floating
interest rate payments during the term of the swap
transaction, in exchange for which the other party receives
fixed interest rate payments. As a rule, the term of the
transaction is over 1 year. The most important difference
between IRS and FRA transactions is that in the former the
floating rate is fixed at the start of the successive interest
periods, while in the latter the market interest rate prevailing
at the date of interest payment applies. In addition, IRS
transactions are usually longer maturity transactions and
interest rate payments are exchanged several times. The two
products are similar, and so are risks and expected premia;
albeit as interest rate payments are exchanged several times,
credit risk premia in IRS transactions are likely to be higher.
WHICH MARKET INSTRUMENT TO
CHOOSE TO MEASURE INTEREST RATE
EXPECTATIONS?
If financial markets operate properly, interest rate
expectations computed from various instruments will be
similar, taking into account the diversity of the risk
characteristics of the instruments. That is, if forward yields
are adjusted for the premium corresponding to the risk
implied in an instrument or changes in yields are analysed,
they will reflect similar expectations. The conditions for the
above are that the market must be sufficiently deep and liquid
for information on expectations to be reflected in returns and
for changes in risk premia not to be the major drivers of
changes in returns.
Initially, central banks used forward yields computed from
government securities market yields to quantify expectations,
because government securities markets were liquid and
operated properly in most countries, and the direct link
between yields and expectations was the most important
consideration when selecting instruments. The development of
financial markets and the emergence of new instruments have
increased the liquidity and importance of the inter-bank
markets significantly over the past decade. This has led to inter-
bank yields playing an increasingly central role in measuring
interest rate expectations. Although, due to credit risks, the
linkage between yields and expectations is less direct than in the
government securities market, this is counterbalanced by the
depth of the market which allows for more information to be
gathered. As a result, the number of the central banks that place
a great emphasis on information derived from inter-bank
returns has been rising, with yield curves estimated with these
returns becoming increasingly common as a tool for measuring
market participants’ expectations.
In 2008, however, disturbances in the financial markets raised
both the risk premia and their volatility, rendering the
assumption about stability untenable. Growth in risk premia
led to yields higher and more volatile than they used to be.
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4 For a detailed discussion of the HUF IRS market, see Balogh et al. (2007).
Chart 1
Two-week forward yields computed from






















(government securities)Consequently, if we adjusted forward yields for former average
risk premia, we would provide a biased estimate of interest rate
expectations, concluding that they will increase and become
uncertain. The difference could be especially striking in the
case of short-term expectations, because if markets function
properly, risk premia are lower at shorter maturities; thus, our
measure of the expectations is also more accurate.
Disturbances and tensions affected the individual market
segments and risk factors to a varying extent and at different
points in time. Accordingly, the extent to which the information
content of the expectations measured with different
instruments has become distorted and uncertain varies.
Chart 1 reveals that in November 2007 the path of 2-week
forward yields computed from the yield curves estimated
from government securities market yields and inter-bank
returns reflected rate cut expectations that were steep over
the short run and moderate over the medium term. In
contrast, both the shape and the level of the forward interest
rate path derived from the yield curves of October 2008 were
markedly different: inter-bank yields follow a steep path over
the very short term and a declining path beyond a 6-month
horizon; as regards the path settled on yields on government
securities, they first decline, then rise steeply over a horizon
of up to 2-2.5 years.
Difference in the expectations measured with the prices of
the various instruments does not offer any guidance as to
which path is the “right” one, the one better reflecting
actual expectations. In order to be able to make the right
decision, we must analyse the extent to which turbulences
in the financial markets affected the individual market
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5 Overnight index swap: a short-term interest rate swap whose underlying product (the benchmark yield of a leg changing daily) is SONIA, the Sterling Overnight
Interbank Average Rate.
6 Inflation Report, November 2007, Bank of England and Inflation Report Conditioning Path for Interest Rates.
7 ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2007.
8 ECB Monthly Bulletin, September 2008.
Significant differences between expectations computed from various
data sources are not an isolated occurrence. In August 2007, a sharp rise
in the size and the volatility of risk premia triggered by disturbances in
the financial markets prompted several central banks to check whether
the conventional instruments and methods used for the quantification
of interest rate expectations still suited that purpose. The issue was
particularly important for the Bank of England (BoE) and the European
Central Bank (ECB) as they make their macro-economic projections on
the basis of market participants’ interest rate expectations rather than
the assumption of an unchanged central bank rate path. In their case,
market disturbances hit inter-bank markets rather than the government
securities market hard and permanently.
Between November 2004 and August 2007, the Bank of England used
forward yields computed from the yield curve settled on unsecured
inter-bank transactions to determine the path of interest rate
expectations. The reason why unsecured inter-bank transactions was
selected was market liquidity. Liquidity in both the secured inter-bank
market and the government securities market was tighter and the
number of the available instruments was lower especially at short
maturities. Implied forward yields were adjusted for credit risk premia
measured with the historical average difference between returns on
secured (repo) transactions and those on unsecured deals as well as the
average differential between returns on repo transactions and the
central bank base rate. But in August 2007, inter-bank returns and
government securities market yields diverged, which was attributable
to banks’mistrust of each other and a steep rise in credit risk premia. As
a result, the adjustment made earlier no longer reflected credit risk
premia properly. Therefore, the group of the instruments used for
measuring short-term expectations was changed, and until May 2008
the Inflation Report was settled on the path of expectations calculated
from repo yields, which, although it was previously less liquid, did not
reflect credit risks. Later, repo yields were replaced by OIS
5 transactions
because liquidity in this market segment rose significantly. No similar
difficulty was experienced in respect of longer-term expectations; the
disturbances thought to be temporary first of all markedly raised
returns on short-term instruments. Therefore, the data source used to
predict the yield curve at a horizon of over 1 year remained the same.
6
Nearly a year later, the ECB also changed the group of instruments that
it used for measuring market expectations. Prior to September 2008, it
used the forward yield curve estimated from inter-bank market data
(swap returns) to approximate the market expectations of the policy
rate. As an alternative, the use of EURIBOR futures was also considered,
but this market was sufficiently liquid only for contracts with a maturity
of up to 3 years, and the models that it used required the quantification
of a longer path of expectations.
7 By September 2008 the gap between
the expectations computed from one data source and those computed
from the other had grown wide, and in the opinion of the ECB, the path
derived from EURIBOR futures better reflected actual expectations in
the short run and their information content was less distorted by
market disturbances.
8
Box: International experiencessegments and identify the impacts in play in the markets of
the individual instruments. In order to measure
expectations, we would like to use returns on the
instruments which contain the largest possible amount of
information; therefore, our primary concern is trends in
liquidity in the individual markets. Furthermore, we can
compare the forward yields obtained from various data
sources with the expectations expressed in surveys.
Expectations in analyst surveys, however, may not
necessarily reflect market participants’ expectations
accurately, as possible biases originate from respondents’
motivations rather than market disturbances. Accordingly,
the expected interest rate path may serve as a benchmark
that is left unaffected by market turbulences.
LIQUIDITY AND THE INFORMATION
CONTENT OF PRICES IN THE INDIVIDUAL
MARKET SEGMENTS DURING MARKET
TURBULENCES
Indicators
9 describing changes in the liquidity of the
individual market segments (Chart 2) suggest that, in respect
of the Hungarian financial markets, it is the government
securities market where strong and permanent disturbances
in operation emerged. In particular, liquidity indicators
related to the behaviour of prices suggest disturbances in both
the government securities and the unsecured inter-bank
credit markets.
10 The widening of the bid-ask spread is
especially significant, which compromises the information
content of the observed prices, and, even if we exclude risk
premia, significant errors materialise in measuring
expectations.
During the period of turbulence on the government securities
market in March 2008 liquidity risk rose sharply and its
fluctuation was also stronger than before. The increased
volatility of the liquidity premium leads to considerable
uncertainty in estimating its size. Furthermore, there were
dry spells in the market during certain periods, so much so
that quoting banks had to suspend quoting for some time, or
there were quotes only for limited volumes. As a result, the
information content of benchmark yields concerning
expectations is highly questionable, which renders 2-week
forward yields derived from the yield curve estimated from
yields on government securities useless as a tool for the
quantification of policy rate expectations.
There were also disturbances in the Hungarian inter-bank
market in the autumn of 2008: a confidence crisis led to a rise
in perceived counterparty risks and inter-bank trading came
to a standstill with transactions concluded with the central
bank replacing the inter-bank market. This led to a rise in
both credit risk and liquidity premia. Nevertheless, according
to the liquidity measures tension seemed to be lower than in
the government securities market and wore off faster. Only
estimates and aggregate data are available on the liquidity of
FRA and IRS markets prior to 2009 (Table 1). From 2008
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Bid-ask spread (government securities)
Aggregate liquidity measure (government securities)
Bid-ask spread (inter-bank)
Aggregate liquidity measure (inter-bank)
Source: JPMorgan.
Average daily traded volume Bid-ask spread (basis point)
(HUF billion) FRA IRS
2006–2007 100 8 5
2007–2008 40 20 10
Table 1
Liquidity of the HUF FRA and IRS markets 
(an estimate for the London inter-bank market)
9 For the calculation and interpretation of liquidity indicators, see Páles and Varga (2008).
10The chart contains indicators of overnight maturity.onwards, they all point to liquidity constraints. At the same
time, however, despite its widening, the bid-ask spread is
roughly what can be regarded as average in the government
securities market and lower than what was experienced there
in turbulent times.
Based on liquidity indicators, it seems reasonable to say that
forward yields computed from the yield curve estimated from
inter-bank yields better approximate actual short-term policy
rate expectations than those derived from the government
securities market curve.
Increased volatility of forward yields computed from the
yield curve (Chart 3) also suggests that disturbances leave a
stronger footprint in the government securities market. The
volatility of forward yields reflecting interest rate
expectations for various points in time used to be similar in
the case of both yield curves. Since the second half of
October 2008, however, the volatility of government
securities market yields has grown significantly. This means
that we face considerably higher uncertainty regarding the
information content of our measures of expectations if we
rely on government securities yields rather than on inter-
bank returns.
WHAT DID ANALYST EXPECTATIONS
SUGGEST DURING THIS PERIOD?
Comparing data on implied forward yields obtained from the
two different data sources with the results of the surveys
conducted by Reuters and portfolio.hu among analysts, we
arrive at a similar conclusion (Charts 4 and 5). Prior to the
spring of 2008, forward yields computed from the two data
sources reflect similar interest rate expectations. The
government securities market curve was generally below the
curve estimated from inter-bank returns, reflecting a lower
credit risk premium. In the first half of 2008 we detected the
first major divergence between the two curves. The
government securities market curve reflected 50-100-basis
point higher short-term expectations than surveys and the
curve computed from inter-bank returns did. The difference
became even more conspicuous after September 2008 and
emerged even in longer-term expectations. The gap that
became narrower temporarily widened significantly in
February 2009. Based on the above, it seems that, overall, in
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Chart 3
2-week forward yields beginning at various points in
time estimated from the government securities
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bank returns that approximated short-term rate expectations
better.
THE INTER-BANK YIELD CURVE IN
PERIODS OF TURBULENCE: WHAT DOES
BUBOR REFLECT?
Based on the above, it is safe to say that since the spring of
2008, the forward yield curve for inter-bank market yields
has predicted interest rate expectations more reliably.
However, disturbances also emerged in the inter-bank market
in the autumn of 2008, with liquidity ebbing away. This may
lead to distortions also in BUBOR and FRA fixings, on which
the yield curve estimates are based, and thus to erroneous
conclusions about expectations. In the following, we will
examine possible biases in detail, and describe how – taking
these factors into consideration – we can measure and
interpret expectations more reliably. In doing so, we will
focus on developments in the 3-month BUBOR. The reason
for this is that this maturity is of key importance for two
reasons. One is that the 3-month BUBOR is the underlying
product of other market instruments (e.g. FRAs), and the
other is that it serves as a benchmark interest rate for several
types of corporate loans.
In addition to the fact that lower liquidity caused by a
confidence crisis and the temporary drying-up of the inter-
bank market distorted the information content of returns, the
question which also arises in connection with BUBOR is how
well the quotes provided by quoting banks reflect actual
expectations. As no actual transaction is concluded at
BUBOR, no costs are incurred if the interest rates provided
by quoting banks reflect neither expectations of the base rate,
nor the rate to be applied to possible transactions reliably.
This type of bias does not necessarily originate from a lack of
interest on the banks’ part. Rather, lower liquidity in the
unsecured inter-bank market is very likely to play a role
during market turbulences. This particularly affected the
market segment of transactions with longer maturities where
business turnover is far lower than that in the market segment
of overnight transactions. Since December 2008, loan
transactions with a maturity of 3 months or longer have
practically disappeared from the inter-bank market. As the
market is illiquid, banks quoting BUBOR have no benchmark
with which to compare their quotes. They cannot adjust their
fixings to the interest rates of actual transactions. Although
the adoption of BUBOR as a benchmark rate for corporate
loans may mean that banks do have a stake at risk and bet on
the accuracy of their expectations, this does not necessarily
guarantee that quotes are in line with interest rate
expectations.
This concern seems to be justified by the recent rigidity of
BUBOR fixings. Since December 2008 the 3-month BUBOR
has practically been identical with the current base rate
despite the fact that until mid-February FRAs and,
occasionally, analyst projections had reflected significant rate
cut expectations (Chart 6).
Theoretically, a higher BUBOR may reflect either the fact
that, in the case of inter-bank lending, relative to FRA
transactions and lending to the central bank, banks expect
higher premia compensating counterparty risks or a higher
liquidity premium due to market frictions. During easing
cycles and corresponding expectations of rate cuts, it is
particularly difficult to decide whether the fact that the level
of BUBOR exceeds FRA returns is attributable to credit risk
premia or a bias in fixings. There are two phenomena
suggesting that BUBOR has recently reflected market
participants’ expectations to a lesser extent and banks simply
give the prevailing base rate as their quotes. One is that, if a
higher BUBOR were attributable to risk premia, there would
be more or less continuous fluctuations in BUBOR, as market
participants would revise their expectations in response to
new incoming information. Sudden changes after rate-setting
meetings occur only if the new base rate differs from
expectations, it came as a surprise. Furthermore, fluctuations
in risk premia may also lead to volatility in the level of
BUBOR rates. However, fluctuations in BUBOR are minimal,
in fact, much lower than those in FRAs; changes occur in a
step-wise manner, coinciding with rate cuts.
Furthermore, BUBOR remained unchanged when, between
mid-February and end of March 2009, FRA returns,
consistent with analyst expectations, reflected the pricing-out
of rate cut expectations and the emergence of expectations of
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Chart 6

































































































































































































































































Central bank base rate 3h BUBOR 1X4 MID
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Per cent Per centa base rate increase. If the explanation concerning the risk
premium were valid, BUBOR fixings should be substantially
higher than the prevailing policy rate since early March. The
above notwithstanding, BUBOR has stayed close to the policy
rate and has hardly followed the rise or the volatility
experienced in FRAs since late January. However, as Chart 6
clearly shows, this was not always the case over the past two
years. Subject to the prevailing market situation, BUBOR has
changed nearly as dynamically as FRAs have.
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One of the consequences of BUBOR losing its information
content is that the yield curve estimated from the returns on
inter-bank instruments offers a somewhat more accurate
picture of expectations if we do not use data on BUBOR
fixings (Chart 7).
HOW ARE FRA RETURNS TO BE
TREATED?
The question now arises whether FRA fixings, even if they
change dynamically in response to changes in market
sentiment, contain any bias caused by the fact that they are
settled against a “sticky” BUBOR that fails to reflect
expectations over the following 3-month period. In this
case, FRA transactions can be regarded as if their
underlying product (the benchmark rate) were a 3-month
interest rate identical with the central bank base rate
prevailing at the due date. In this case, FRA deals reflect
expectations in relation to this instrument, i.e.
expectations of the central bank base rate prevailing at the
due date. In interpreting expectations, this represents a
significant difference: FRA returns show expectations
regarding the central bank base rate prevailing at the start
of the transaction rather than the average base rate during
the maturity period of the transaction. Thus, if the 3-
month BUBOR reflected market participants’ average
interest rate expectations for the coming 3 months, then
the 3-month FRA 1 month ahead would reflect
expectations of a BUBOR prevailing 1 month later, which
comprises the expectations of the average of the central
bank rates during the 3-month period 1 month ahead. If,
however, BUBOR is identical with the base rate, then it
reflects the expectations prevailing at the start of the
transaction, i.e. expectations of the following month’s base
rate. In this case, FRA returns commencing at various
points in time directly indicate the expected central bank
rate path. This would also mean that FRA returns have a
characteristic gradual pattern, because expectations of rate
cuts are reflected in prices when the period leading up to
the settlement of the transaction contains the day,
immediately following the rate-setting meeting, on which
change is expected to occur.
12 If BUBOR did not get stuck
at all, no calendar effects of this type, only expectations of
future policy rates and the difference in BUBOR relative to
them should be reflected in FRA returns.
There are sharp falls in FRA returns on some days, especially
on rate-setting days or on the days immediately preceding
them, which might lead to the conclusion that this is because
of the ‘cave-in’ of future BUBOR fixings related to expected
rate cuts. This hypothesis has also been confirmed by
anecdotal information. Nevertheless, examining the dates
closely reveals that such major falls do not occur exactly on
the day of rate cuts at the beginning of the relevant future
period (i.e. the day when a fall in BUBOR serving as a
benchmark rate is expected to materialise).
13 Furthermore,
significant changes in returns on FRAs with various
maturities (e.g. 1 v 4, 2 v 5, etc.) occur on the same day
despite the fact that the period intervening between two rate-
setting meetings is not exactly one month. It follows that the
data do not fully prove our assumption that FRA returns
reflect expectations of the base rate directly. This is due, in
part, to the fact that recent lower liquidity is manifest in a less
efficient FRA market, and it may be the case that some banks
fail to change fixings on these ‘cut off dates’.
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11 As during the initial period the benchmark rate for BUBOR is fixed, its volatility should be lower than that of FRAs.
12 Except for extraordinary cases, a new base rate enters into force on the day immediately following rather than on the rate-setting day. Thus, under our assumption, it
will be reflected in the following day’s BUBOR fixings.
13 For instance, conventionally, the value date of a 1 v 4 FRA transaction concluded on 7 April 2009 is 9 April (T+2); the start date of the forward period would thus be
9 May. As, however, it falls on a weekend, it is the first working day following it (i.e. 11 May). BUBOR, which forms the basis for settlement, is the 7 May fixing for this
day (T-2).
Chart 7
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Inter-bank yield curve Inter-bank yield curve
excluding BUBOR Reuters survey
Portfolio surveyAt the same time, however, the very fact that, in addition to
expectations reflecting a declining interest rate path, FRA
rates fall before rate-setting meetings without either
fundamentals or market sentiments changing significantly
suggests that market participants take into consideration the
rigidity of BUBOR and its adherence to the base rate in their
pricing.
CONCLUSIONS
In August 2007, a sharp rise in the level and the volatility
of risk premia triggered by disturbances in the financial
markets prompted several central banks to check whether
the conventional instruments and methods used for
measuring interest rate expectations still suited that
purpose. Our analysis argued that it was in the government
securities market that market turbulences caused the
largest and the lengthiest disturbances in Hungary.
Therefore, the yield curve computed from yields in the
government securities market is less suitable for measuring
market participants’ expectations than it used to be.
Recently, analyst expectations in various surveys have been
followed more closely by forward yields computed from
yield curves estimated from inter-bank returns. However,
liquidity in the inter-bank market has decreased tangibly
and the prices of certain instruments have become
distorted. Since the end of 2008 BUBOR has been
unsuitable for measuring market expectations. Fixings have
lost their former flexibility and now cling to the prevailing
rather than the future base rate. One of the consequences
of BUBOR losing its information content is that the yield
curve estimated from the returns on inter-bank market
instruments offers a somewhat more accurate measure of
expectations if we do not use data on BUBOR fixings.
Nevertheless, FRAs based on BUBOR remain suitable for
quantifying market participants’ expectations provided
that, when interpreting them, in addition to credit and
liquidity premia we take into account the bias caused by
BUBOR. If BUBOR is basically identical with the prevailing
base rate, FRA returns reflect expectations of the central
bank base rate prevailing at the start of their maturity
period rather than expectations of the average central bank
base rate during their maturity.
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